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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
YONKERS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS 
Upon the Charge of Violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law, 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ0, (DAVID M. STEIN, 
ESQ., of Counsel) for Respondent 
ARTHUR J. DORAN, ESQ„, for Charging Party 
On October 17, 1977, the chief legal officer of the 
Yonkers City School District (District) filed a charge against 
the Yonkers Federation of Teachers (Federation) alleging that it 
had engaged in an illegal fifteen day strike on September 7, 8, 
9, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30, 1977. The 
Federation conceded the absences which were the basis for the 
charge, but it denied that those absences constituted a strike. 
It asserted that a more appropriate characterization of the 
absences would be a "constructive lock-out" because the District 
engaged in conduct which "extinguished" , the employees' duty to 
report to work0 
The hearing officer concluded that no principle of 
"constructive lock-out" exists within the meaning of the Taylor 
Law. If employees who are required to report to work, he found, 
concertedly refuse to do so, they are on strike. This, according 
to the hearing officer, is what occurred. On the other hand, 
upon examining the conduct of the District that the Federation 
asserted was a "constructive lock-out", -the hearing officer con-
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eluded that the District had engaged in such acts of extreme 
provocation as to detract from the responsibility of the Federation 
for the strike. Among the circumstances upon which he based his 
conclusion were the District's entering into individual agreements 
with teachers in which the teachers waived their rights to submit 
certain contract grievances, taunting statements attributable to 
the District, and a disclosed policy of the District of achieving 
its bargaining goals either through negotiations or through uni-
lateral action. Summarizing the District's conduct, the hearing 
officer said that they "had the intended effect of, and did indeed, 
exacerbate already strained tensions and anxieties„" 
The Federation filed a brief in which it took issue with 
thereport and recommendations of the hearing officer. The District 
did not file a brief. In its brief, the Federation argues that the 
hearing officer erred in that he failed to find a "constructive 
lock-out". It also argues that the hearing officer erred in find-
ing that the fifteen-day interruption of services impacted upon 
1] 
the welfare of the community„ Assuming a determination that it 
1] The Federation makes two further contentions: that the hearing 
officer committed error by refusing to issue subpoenas duces 
tecum for minutes of Board of Education executive sessions for 
the period January 1977 to October 1977, where the Federation 
was a subject of discussion; and that it was denied due pro-
cess because there was a change of hearing officers during 
the course of the proceeding and the hearing officer who wrote 
the report could not adequately assess the credibility of 
witnesses he did not see. The factual basis for this latter 
contention is that the hearing officer who was originally 
assigned resigned during the course of the three-day hearing. 
We find no merit in either contention. 
The Federation was not prejudiced by the refusal of the hearing 
officer to seek issuance by this Board of subpoenas duces 
tecum on its behalf. Even assuming that it was entitled to 
the subpoenas, it could have obtained them from a court pur-
9&9 
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struck, the Federation asserts that in assessing a penalty, this 
Board should take into account the conduct of the Federation sub-
sequent to the strike. Those events, according to the Federation, 
reflect a return to harmonious labor relations as evidenced by the 
negotiation of a successor agreement without any untoward incidents, 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer rejecting 
the Federation's argument that there was no strike because the 
absences were attributable to a "constructive lock-out". The 
Federation's argument is that conduct of a public employer may be 
so provocative as to justify a strike by a union. The legislative 
history of the Taylor Law refutes this argument,and makes clear 
that an employee organization is not relieved of its responsibil-
2] 
ity for a strike by reason of an employer's conduct. 
We also affirm the hearing officer's conclusion that the 
strike impacted upon the welfare of the community. The record 
shows that normal student attendance on the days when the strike 
occurred would have been about 24,000 out of a total of 26,000 
FN1 (cont'd) 
suant to CPLR §§2302 and 2307, Thus, at most, it was merely 
inconvenienced. The change of hearing officer also did not 
violate any rights of the Federation. Section 206,6(b)(1) of 
the Rules of this Board specifically authorizes such a sub-
stitution of hearing officers. Moreover, the hearing officer's 
report reveals no reliance upon controverted testimony given 
before his predecessor, and thus, no need to resolve credi-
bility questions involving such testimony, 
2] As originally enacted in 1967, §210,3(e) of the Taylor Law 
stated that an employer's acts of extreme provocation are 
a factor to be considered in determining whether an employee 
organization had violated its statutory duty not to strike. 
In 1969, the statute was amended (L,1969,c,28, §8) to delete 
the reference to extreme provocation from §210,3(e) and to 
insert it in §210,3(f), The effect of this amendment was 
to make clear that extreme provocation should not be con-
sidered as a defense to a strike, but is relevant only to the 
extent of the penalty, „ _ 
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students. Instead, on those days, it was only about 10,000. Of 
the approximately 1,500 regular teachers who should have attended, 
only 50 to 60 came to work each day of the strike. These teachers 
were supplemented by between 300 to 350 per diem substitutes. 
Obviously, the District was unable to provide its mandated services 
to the community during the period of the strike. 
We reject the Federation's argument that we should take 
into account its conduct subsequent to the strike as a factor in 
determining the penalty that should be imposed for a strike. Under 
the terms of the statute (§210.3 [f]') it is relevant only to the 
restoration of dues deduction and agency fee payment privileges 
3] 
that have been ordered suspended for an indefinite period of time. 
The evidence supports the hearing officer's determination 
that the Federation's responsibility for the strike was diminished 
by the District's acts of extreme provocation. The record reveals 
3] The Federation's reliance on City of New York v. DeLury (Specia! 
Term, N.Y.Co., July 3, 1970, 75 LRRM 2275) is not here con-
trolling. There are important differences between the two 
proceedings. In DeLury the union was seeking remission of 
part of the dues checkoff suspension which was one part of a 
penalty that had been assessed at an earlier time after other 
parts of the penalty had already been satisfied. Here, the 
Federation is seeking consideration of its post strike conduct 
in advance of the assessment of any penalty. Also, in DeLury, 
the court found it significant that the employer and the union 
were "in accord" in seeking remission of further penalties 
because of their joint judgment that imposition of the 
remainder of the penalty would incapacitate the union from 
making positive contributions to the "continuation of existing 
harmonious labor relations between the parties...." Having 
determined that the circumstances substantiated the "accord" 
of the parties, the court granted.a conditional modification 
of its prior order which assessed the full penalty. The 
situation here is not comparable. 
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a pattern of conduct on the District's part that, by May 1977, 
clearly signalled its unwillingness to make serious efforts to 
engage in negotiations and achieve a settlement. That conduct 
was marked by unreasonable delays which prevented the institution 
of fruitful negotiations. At the same time, the District exacer-
bated the frustrations of the bargaining process by passing reso-
lutions clearly expressing its intention to make unilateral changes 
in such significant terms and conditions of employment as sabba-
tical leaves, maternity leaves and seniority. The District's 
announced disposition to act on its own persisted through the 
ensuing months. On the evening before the scheduled opening of 
school in September, it informed the Federation's negotiators 
that returning teachers would be faced with unilaterally imposed 
changes announced earlier as well as the reduction of teacher 
preparation time and of released time for the Federation's presi-
dent. It also announced the elimination of grievance arbitration. 
The strike, which began on the day following those an-
nouncements, was clearly provoked by them and by other conduct of 
the district. Although the District faced serious financial dif-
ficulties, those circumstances cannot excuse its conduct. Never-
theless, the District's provocative conduct did not justify the 
strike. The Federation's only lawful recourse against the 
District's improprieties was through the procedures of the Taylor 
Law. However, we do consider the District's conduct in determin-
ing the extent of the penalty to be assessed against the Federation 
#8$ 
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We now consider the appropriate penalties which we deem 
necessary to effectuate the statutory policies,, This is not the 
first strike by the Federation, In 1972 it engaged in an eight-
day strike and, as a consequence, it lost its dues check-off 
4] 
privileges for twelve months„ Ordinarily, we would impose a loss 
of dues check-off and agency shop fee privileges for an indefinite 
period as a penalty for a second strike. Consistent with past 
decisions and under the circumstances here, we would have deter-
mined that a minimum period of eighteen months during which the 
employee organization would not be permitted to apply for rein-
statement of the privileges is reasonable and consistent with 
the statuteo Because of the District's acts of extreme provoca-
tion which detract from the Federation's responsibility for the 
strike, we do not impose a penalty for an indefinite period or 
for so long a time as eighteen months„ We determine that the 
forfeiture of dues deduction and agency shop fee privileges for 
a fixed period of nine months is reasonable under the circum-
stances and that it will effectuate the purposes of §210 of the 
statuteo 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the District cease deduct-
ing dues or agency shop fee payments 
on behalf of the Federation for a 
•
 A * • v
 5 ] 
period of nine months, commencing 
4] See Ybnkers Federation of Teachers, 5 PERB ',[3042 (1972)'. 
5] If dues and agency shop fee payments are not deducted uni-
formly each payroll throughout the year, then no further 
deductions shall be made for a period during which 15% of 
the annual deductions would otherwise be made on behalf of 
the Federation. 
6268 
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on the first practicable date after 
this decision. Thereafter, no dues or 
agency shop fee payments will be 
deducted on its behalf until the 
Federation.affirms that it no longer 
asserts the right to strike against 
any government, as required by 
§210„3(g) of the Taylor Law. 
DATED: New York, New York 
May 2, 1980 
Ida Klaus, Member 
Chairman Newman did not participate, 
DkiOY 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT .-RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the Application of the : 
COUNTY OF NASSAU : BOARD DECISION AND 
UKDEK. 
for a determination pursuant to Section : 
212 of the Civil Service Law. DOCKET NO. S-0002 
At a meeting of the Public Employment Relations Board held 
on the 11th day of April, 1980, and after consideration of the 
application of the County of Nassau made pursuant to Section 212 
of the Civil Service Law for a determination that its Ordinance 
No. 74-A-1978 as last amended by Ordinance 379-A-1979 is substan-
tially equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth 
in Article 14 of the Civil Service Law with respect to the 
State and to the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment 
Relations Board, it is 
ORDERED, that said application be and the same hereby is 
approved upon the determination of the Board that the Ordinance 
aforementioned, as amended, is substantially equivalent to 
the provisions and procedures set forth in Article 14 of the Civi] 
Service Law with /.respect to the State and to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public: Employment Relations Board. 
DATED: Ma:y:". .1, 1980 
,New.-„y.ork ;,..,.New., Y-ork 
<?. A/L, 
OLD R. NEWMAN, Chairman 
«£»4x. /tZ€a,^ <t<4-
IDA KLAUS, Member 
DAVID C. "HANDLES", Memb 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, DIVISION 1342, 
Respondent^, 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BARLOW, ROSENTHAL, SIEGEL, MUENKEL & WOLF 
(JAY N. ROSENTHAL, ESQ., of Counsel) for 
Respondent 
ANTHONY CAGLIOSTRO, ESQ., for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the charge of Counsel to the 
Board (charging party) that the Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Division 1342 (respondent), violated §210.1 of the Taylor Law in 
that it caused,', instigated, encouraged, condoned and engaged in 
a strike against the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority 
(Authority) on December 14 and 15, 1978. A hearing was held on 
April 30, 1979, after which the hearing officer reported her con-
clusion that the employees of the Authority had struck on December 
14 and 15, 1978, but that the strike was not attributable to 
respondent. In its brief to us, respondent asserts that the record 
evidence supports the conclusions of the hearing officer. Charging 
party, however, has submitted a brief in which he argues that the 
hearing officer misinterpreted the record evidence which, he con-
tends, establishes respondent's responsibility for the strike. 
FACTS 
The record shows that, as of December 14, 1978, the 
Authority and respondent were in negotiations for an agreement 
that would succeed one that had expired on August 1, 1978. Two 
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tentative agreements had been recommended by respondent's Execu-
tive Board, but rejected by its membership. The second rejection 
occurred at a membership meeting on December 12, 1978. At the 
meeting held on December 13, 1978, the night before the strike, 
and at other earlier meetings, members had attempted to raise the 
question of a strike, but respondent's president ruled such dis-
cussions out of order. 
At the start of the first shift on December 14, picket 
lines were set up at most work locations, and most employees 
absented themselves from work. There were 637 and 619 unit 
employees absent from work on December 14 and 15, 1978, respective-' 
ly. This amounted to more than 90% of the normal complement of 
unit employees. Among the absentees were members of respondent's 
Executive Board. Ten of these employees had regular assignments, 
which they did not perform on these days. Of these, three 
claimed that they were excused from their regular assignments, but 
the record does not support their claim. A fourth reported for 
work, but did not perform his regular assignment after being told 
not to do so by respondent's president. A fifth claimed that he 
was excused from performing his own job because he was trying to 
get other employees to come to work. The record, however, shows 
that he was told by his superior to leave because he was trans-
acting business on behalf of respondent instead of working. The 
other leaders of respondent who did not work alleged that they 
were engaged in "union business" or that they were concerned 
about crossing the picket line. 
1
 6270 
Board - D-0175 -3 
Respondent's president described the strike as a "wildcat 
and stated that it was not authorized,, He, and some members of 
the Executive Board, visited some of the work locations and made 
statements that reflected an awareness that the strike was 
illegal, but they did not direct employees to return to work. 
Another of respondent's leaders offered to conduct a vote on 
whether the men wished to cross the picket line„ 
Respondent's president directed members of the Executive 
Board to report to respondent's headquarters to be available to 
receive service of a temporary restraining order which would 
require them to instruct respondent's membership to return to 
work, This direction was obeyed and was offered as an excuse 
for the absence of the directors from work on December 15„ Once 
the temporary restraining order was received, the president con-
ducted a vote among the membership of the Executive Board and 
the Officers„ Pursuant to that vote, they instructed the 
employees to return to work, and the employees did so. 
DISCUSSION 
On these facts, we conclude that there was a strike on 
December 14 and 15, 1978. We do not find sufficient evidence to 
support a conclusion that respondent caused or instigated the 
strike. However, once it commenced, the conduct of respondent's 
president and directors establishes that respondent condoned the 
strike„ The unauthorized absence of so many of the directors is 
highly significant. Their action constituted an example for the 
6271 
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rank and file members and they followed it. We also note that 
the strike ended pursuant to a vote of respondent's leaders and 
their direction to the employees to return to work. This plainly 
indicates their control of the situation. That such a vote was 
not held at the earliest possible moment, but was taken only 
after receipt of the restraining order reflects a condonation of 
the strike. Even if the leadership believed that an earlier 
direction to end the strike might not have persuaded a recalcitrant 
membership, which had twice rejected leadership supported agree-
ments, their failure to exert any significant forceful efforts 
to terminate the strike before receipt of the restraining order 
constituted a breach of their obligations and a condonation of 
the strike. 
Accordingly, we find that respondent violated §210.1 of 
the Taylor Law. 
Ordinarily for a first strike lasting two days affecting 
the welfare of the community, but not its health or safety, we 
would have imposed a penalty of six months' forfeiture of dues 
1] 
checkoff and agency shop fee privileges. Because respondent 
condoned the strike but did not cause it, we find that a penalty 
of four months' duration is reasonable and will effectuate the 
policies of the statute. 
1] See, e.g., Mayville Central School Unit of the Civil Service 
Employees Association, 5 PERB 1(3009 (1972) , and Frankfort-
Schuyler Teachers' Association, 5 PERB 1f3062 (1972X 
^ 4 ; 4 & 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority cease 
deducting dues or agency shop fee 
payments on behalf of the Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Division 1342 for a 
period of four months, commencing on 
the first practicable day after the 
date of this decision. Thereafter, no 
dues or agency shop fee payments shall 
be deducted on its behalf by the Authority 
until the union affirms that it no longer 
asserts the right to strike against any 
government, as required by §210.3(g) 
of the Taylor Law. 
DATED: New York, New York 
May 1, 1980 
5Xf^€ <2<*. 
a r o l d R. Newman, Chai rman 
3iUu /C^jg^a.^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GATES-CHILI CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
GATES-CHILI TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
GATES-CHILI EDUCATORS ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3885 
RAYMOND E. MORRIS, ESQ., for Respondent 
GILBERT BIANCUCCI, for Charging Party 
PAUL E. KLEIN, ESQ., for Intervenor 
The .charge herein was filed by the Gates-Chili Teachers 
Association (Association), which is the duly recognized negoti-
ating representative of the teachers employed by the Gates-Chili 
Central School District (District). The charge is that the Dis-
trict eorrmitted an improper practice when it allowed a competing 
employee organization, the Gates-Chili Educators Association ; 
(GCEA), access to mailboxes and other facilities of the District, 
over the objection of the Association- No hearing was held since 
the parties agreed to submit the case on stipulated facts. .In aid 
dition to the facts set forth in this paragraph, the only other 
— GCEA was permited to intervene in the proceeding, 
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stipulated facts are: "At a hearing, the employer,' would offer, 
testimony that GCEA's access prior to the filing of the charge 
consisted of notice of an income tax seminar by a 'tax person' . 
not a member of GCEA, the tax seminar, arid a GCEA newsletter:'" 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge. She found that 
(1) this Board's decisions in Cheektbwaga-Maryvale' union Free 
2/ 3/ 
School District— and ' Great' Neck' Union. Free School District—' did 
not support the contention that the employer may.not grant access 
privileges to an unrecognized competing organization at any time 
other than proximate to the challenge period, (2) Civil Service 
Law §208.2 did not bar the employer's permission, for the distribu-
tion of information to public employees by an outside employee 
organization, at least in the absence of evidence of improper 
motivation on the part of the District to circumvent its obliga-
tions to the Association, and (3) any claim of a contract right 
to exclusivity of access is beyond this Board's jurisdiction. The 
matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Association to the 
decision of the hearing officer. 
77 
- 11 PERB 113080 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , a f f i r m e d Mary v a l e ' E d u c a t o r s A s s o c i a t i o n 
v . Newman, 70 App. Div. 2d .758 (Th'ir d Dep t ." , 1979"), ':,.: """•"/""• -
12 PERB 117009, m o t i o n f o r l e a v e t o a p p e a l . den ied , 48 NY2d 605 
( 1 9 7 9 ) , 12 PERB 117018. 
-
f
 11 PERB 113079 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . 
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DISCUSSION 
In support of its exceptions, the Association argues that 
this Board's Cheektowaga-Maryvale and Great Neck decisions held 
that a public employer must deny access privileges for all pur-
poses to an unrecognized competing organization at all times not 
proximate to the challenge period. No such holding was required 
by the facts of those cases. They were brought by unrecognized 
employee organizations which charged public employers with im-
properly favoring the duly recognized employee organization by 
denying the outside organizations equal access to teachers and 
mailboxes for the purpose of soliciting support and membership in 
the organization. Taken together, those two decisiors hold that a 
public employer is under no Taylor Law duty to permit an unrecog-
nized competing employee organization such access to teachers and 
teacher mailboxes at a time which is remote from the period when 
the outside organization can petition for certification, but that 
the competing organization must be permitted such access when the 
time for filing of a petition is proximate. This case, therefore, 
is one of first impression for this Board in that it presents for 
the first time the question of the nature of the employer's obli-
gation under the statute toward a recognized employee organization 
as to the use of its facilities by an outside employee organiza-
tion for any purpose at times other than the challenge period. 
A recognized employee organization's right to "unchallenged" 
representation status" (CSL §208.2) reflects a basic policy of 
the Act to accord a period of stability to the employer-union, .v.* 
relationship. The representative freely chosen by a majority of 
the employees in the negotiating unit has a right to a period of 
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quiet enjoyment of its status as their agent for recognized labor 
relations purposes. Among other things, this means that the 
employer may not improperly deal with or support another employee 
organization. An employer, therefore, is not free to grant 
whatever access privileges it chooses to an unrecognized competing 
organization during the period of unchallenged representation 
status. Such privileges could be used for purposes which would 
undermine the status of the recognized representative and, thus, 
improperly interfere with the employees' right to choose their 
own- representative. 
The Association has chosen to submit its case on the barest 
of records. The facts in this record do not permit us to find 
that the access actually permitted to GCEA by the District was 
of such a nature or for such a purpose as to constitute improper 
interference with the status and rights of the Association and 
the employees it represents. All we have before us is a single 
instance of permitting an entity, which happens to be another 
employee organization, to .sponsor a "tax seminar" held on the 
District's premises and allowing it simply to communicate notice 
of that seminar through the school mailboxes. We know nothing 
further about the purposes of the "tax seminar" or about the cir-
cumstances under which it took place at that time.:±/ We are 
constrained, therefore, to hold that, on this record, there is 
insufficient evidence of improper conduct by the District. 
We do not pass upon the propriety of permitting the distri-
bution of the GCEA newsletter, since the contents thereof 
were not placed in evidence. 
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The Association also argues that the terms of its contract 
with the District give it a right to exclusive access of any kind 
to the teachers of the District. This is a question of contract 
enforcement which is not a proper one for this Board to consider. 
St. Lawrence County, 10 PERB 1f3058 (1977); CSL §205.5(d). 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 1, 1980 
New York, New York 
ROLD R. NEWMAN, Chairman 
IDA KLAUS, Member 
DAVID C. RANDLES, 
£VO,HM 
0*J i O 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF' NASSAU, 
Respondent, 
-and-
NASSAU CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
EDWARD G. McCABE, ESQ. (JACK OLCHIN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
RICHARD M. GABA, ESQ., for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the Motion of the Nassau 
Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (charging 
party) to dismiss exceptions filed by the County of Nassau to a 
hearing officer decision that the County had committed an improper 
practice. The basis of the motion is. that the exceptions were not 
timely filed. 
On September 4, 1979, the hearing officer issued a decision 
in which he determined that the County of Nassau had improperly 
increased the number of working hours and working days of certain 
of its employees and he ordered the County to "restore and revert 
to the shift schedule in effect prior to July 14, 1978 and...reccm 
pense, at the overtime rate, its employees who have worked in 
excess of the working week established by the former schedule." 
BOARD DECISION ON .MOTION. 
CASE NO. U-3511 
Board on Motion - U-3511 -2 
Section 204.10 of the Rules of this Board provide that an 
aggrieved party can file exceptions to the decision of a hearing 
officer within fifteen working days of its receipt of the decision. 
The Nassau County Attorney filed exceptions with the Board and 
served a copy of the exceptions upon the charging party. He 
alleges that he did so on September 25, 1979, by depositing in a 
United States mail box envelopes addressed to this Board and to 
the charging party which contained the exceptions. By November 1, 
1979, the County Attorney knew that the exceptions had not been 
delivered either to this Board or to the charging party. Never-
theless, the County did not file and serve substitute papers until 
March 24, 1980. In explanation of this delay, the County Attorney 
states that he was very busy between the time he was informed that 
the exceptions had not been delivered and November 30, 1979, when 
he went on vacation. Moreover, shortly after his return from 
vacation, the County Attorney became ill and was absent from work 
until approximately ten days before the exceptions were finally 
filed';- . 
The County's explanation for its late filing is not ac-
ceptable. The delay between the time when the County Attorney was 
informed that the exceptions were not received and the time when 
he left on vacation was, in itself, more than fifteen working days. 
Moreover, the. County Attorney's vacation is not a circumstance 
which would justify the County's failure to file and serve its 
exceptions within the required time limits.— 
1 " ~~~ — 
See Westbury Union Free School D i s t r i c t , 12 PER.B 1f3107 (1979). 
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Accordingly, we grant the Motion of the charging party and 
WE ORDER that the exceptions herein be, and they hereby 
are, DISMISSED. -
DATED: New York, New York 
May 2, 1980 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman A^L/ 
/Q£**A*. *&* 
Ida Klaus, Member 
AJL^.T&A 
David C. Randies, Mte*nber 
2 • The effect of this order is that 
Section 204.14(b) of our Rules of Procedure imposes the deci-
sion and recommended.order of the hearing officer. 
fc? A o ' 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
EAST IRONDEQUOIT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
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This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the East Irondequoit Central 
School District (Respondent) to a hearing officer's decision that it violated 
its duty to negotiate in good faith with the Association of East Irondequoit 
Administrators (Charging Party). For twenty years, administrators employed by 
Respondent who are now in a negotiating unit represented by Charging Party had 
worked an 11-month schedule. On June 18, 1979, Respondent's school board 
adopted a resolution which provided for a 10-month work schedule. The resolu-
tion stated: 
"RESOLVED, That, effective July 1, 1979, elementary principals 
be placed on a 10-month work schedule. Payment for work per-
formed during recess or vacation periods during the 1979-30 
school year will be made on the basis of l/200th of adjusted 
1978-79 salary; and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Superintendent of Schools 
be authorized to determine the need for work assignments beyond 
the 10-month schedule, subject to Board of Education approval." 
The new schedule took effect on July 1, 1979, the day following the expi-
ration of the last agreement between the parties. At the time when the reso-
lution was passed, the parties were in negotiations for an agreement to succeed 
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the one that was expiring. 
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Respondent, in its exceptions, concedes that it unilaterally changed the 
work year of some of its administrators while it was in negotiations for an 
agreement covering the terms and conditions of employment of those administra-
tors. It argues, however, that the unilateral change was consistent with its 
Taylor Law obligations because the curtailment of working time was in the 
nature of1a partial layoff of the administrative employees and, thus, in 
accordance with New Rochelle, 4 PERB 1(3060 (1971). That argument had been 
presented to and was rejected by the hearing officer. She determined that 
the amount of work assigned to the affected administrators had not been sigtv 
nificantly curtailed by Respondent's unilateral action. The administrators 
were required to do substantially the same services and amount of work as before, 
although some of their assignments:• were rescheduled. Thus, according to the 
hearing officer, the applicable rule is stated in City of Oswego, 5 PERB 1(3011 
(1972), aff'd Oswego School District v. Helsby, 42 App.Div. 2d 262 (3rd Dept., 
1973) and not New Rochelle,. supra. 
In Oswego, as here, in order to reduce their compensation, a school 
district curtailed the work year of administrators without intending to limit 
the services performed by them. The court said (at pages 264 and 265): 
"The length of the work year is a function of hours of work 
and thus a 'term of employment'.... The employer's decision 
in the instant case does not fall into the concept of a basic 
policy decision but is simply a unilateral decision to change 
the hours and wages of the school administrators without nego-
tiation." 
Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments of the parties, we 
affirm the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER Respondent to restore the 11-month work 
schedule of the affected administrative employees 
and to compensate, such employees for any loss of 
salary and other benefits. 
DATED: New York, New York 
May 2, 1980 
^/^/l/L <-&c£7Z*c^&^&r ^ >-
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member f 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the Application of the : 
COUNTY OF DELAWARE : B 0 A R D DECISION AND 
OKDEJK 
for a determination pursuant to Section : „_.,„,„„,
 M_ 0 nnc_. 212 of the Civil Service Law. DOCKET NO. S-0057 
At a meeting of the Public Employment Relations Board held 
on the 2nd day of May, 1980, and after consideration of the 
application of the County of Delaware made pursuant to Section 212 
of the Civil Service Law for a determination that its Resolution 
No. 42, dated June 12, 1969, as last amended by Resolution No. 102. 
dated April 9, 1980 is substantially equivalent to the provisions 
and procedures set forth in Article 14 of the Civil Service Law 
with respect to the. State and to the Rules of Procedure of the 
Public Employment Reflations Board, it is 
ORDERED, that said application be and the same hereby is 
approved upon the determination of the Board that the Resolution 
aforementioned, as amended, is substantially equivalent to the 
provisions and procedures set forth in Article 14 of the Civil 
Service Law with respect to the State and to the Rules of Proce-
dure of the Public Employment Relations Board. 
DATED: New York, New York 
May 2, 1980 
HAROLD R. NEWMAN, Chairman 
«4 «rtr-* 
IDA KLAUS, Member 
PUBLIC 
STATU OF NEW YORK 
5MPLOYMEHT RELATIO BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, CORNING CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, Case No. C-1929 
-and 
CORNING CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT EDUCATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATORS/SUPERVISORS. ASSOCIATION, " 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment -Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Corning City School District 
Educational Administrators/Supervisors Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances-. 
Unit: Included: Principals, Assistant Principals, Supervisor of 
Building & Grounds, Supervisor of School Lunch 
Program, Director of .Physical Education, Super- -
visor of Pupil Personnel Services, Supervisor of 
Transportation, Assistant Director of" Head Start. 
Excluded: All others. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the Corning City School 
District Educational Administrators/Supervisors Association' 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization' 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
! negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
i determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
|, Signed on the 1st 
i' New York-, New York 
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-day of May., 1980 
Harold R 
c?k<c- /(JZ&CCA— 
Ida Klaus, Member 
>aviu . C. 'Handles , t-i^ ibor 
